End of the “Thana Culture” or Death of the System?
By Mian Iftikhar Ahmad
Has Pakistan’s Police System Become Completely Hollow from Within? Pakistan’s policing and criminal justice system is experiencing a profound, widespread, and structural decline rooted deeply in historical, legal, administrative, political, and social structures. When the question arises whether Pakistan’s police system has become completely dysfunctional, a realistic assessment suggests that the system has become largely paralyzed in delivering its fundamental security and public service functions. However, it continues to serve a particular purpose: maintaining a form of colonial-style control. In the immediate aftermath of the War of Independence of 1857, the British colonial government introduced the Police Act of 1861, primarily to preserve British rule, suppress the Indian population, and crush public uprisings. The philosophy underpinning this legislation emphasized imperial authority and domination rather than public service. More than seven decades after Pakistan’s independence, the fundamental structure of this colonial framework remains largely unchanged. Consequently, despite the transformation of the state, the police institution has continued to function more as an instrument of the political and administrative elite than as a public service organization.
Cosmetic Changes Instead of Structural Reform: Past attempts to address the deterioration of policing have largely been superficial, failing to transform the institution’s underlying structure. One example is the replacement of Punjab Police’s traditional khaki trousers and black shirts with olive-green uniforms, followed a few years later by another change toward navy-blue and black uniforms. These were largely cosmetic measures with little connection to professional conduct, investigative standards, transparency, or institutional ethics. Research and policy discussions in Pakistan and internationally have repeatedly emphasized that changing the color or design of police uniforms cannot resolve deficiencies in investigative capacity, the harshness of thana culture, or violations of citizens’ dignity. Unless fundamental changes are introduced in institutional culture, traditional training methods, investigative funding, and accountability mechanisms, uniform changes will remain little more than expensive symbolic exercises.
How the System Reproduces Its Own Culture: One of the principal reasons for the persistence of colonial attitudes within the police is the institutional environment through which new recruits gradually absorb existing practices. In organizational sociology and criminology, this process is often described as institutional socialization or cultural assimilation. When an ambitious, educated young person with strong ethical values joins the force as a constable, sub-inspector, or assistant superintendent of police, they encounter a rigid and outdated system characterized by severe resource shortages, inappropriate working hours, inadequate housing and healthcare, and intense pressure from senior officers and political figures. The absence of government funding for investigations can create circumstances in which investigating officers resort to illegally collecting money from complainants or suspects. Officers who refuse to participate in corrupt or abusive practices and attempt to maintain their integrity may face punitive transfers to remote areas, professional marginalization, or administrative obstacles to promotion. As a result, many new recruits gradually adapt to established practices simply to survive within the system and protect their careers. In this way, the institution continues reproducing the very thana culture that reformers seek to eliminate.
Why Abolishing the Police Is Not the Solution: Despite the gravity of these problems, dismantling the entire police institution overnight and immediately replacing it with a completely new force is neither practically feasible nor legally or security-wise advisable. Removing the police from any country overnight would create a dangerous law-and-order vacuum that criminal networks, terrorists, and extremist groups could exploit, potentially plunging society into chaos. The solution, therefore, lies not in sudden institutional destruction but in a planned, phased, and comprehensive program of structural and legal reforms. One of the most comprehensive reform frameworks in Pakistan’s history was the Police Order 2002, developed following extensive work by legal and administrative experts. Its central objectives included freeing police operational command from undue political interference, providing legal protection to the tenures of the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Senior Superintendents of Police (SSPs), and Station House Officers (SHOs), and separating criminal investigation from the maintenance of law and order. The framework also proposed independent public safety commissions and police complaints authorities at district, provincial, and national levels, enabling civilians and civil society representatives to exercise oversight over police performance.
Why Police Order 2002 Failed to Achieve Its Original Objectives : Police Order 2002 was never implemented throughout the country in accordance with its original spirit. A major obstacle was resistance from Pakistan’s political elite and bureaucracy, which were unwilling to relinquish their longstanding influence over police appointments and operations. Members of national and provincial assemblies, local politicians, and other influential groups have frequently treated the appointment of an SHO as a source of local political power. Control over police postings can be used to initiate cases against opponents, influence electoral processes, and maintain political dominance within constituencies. Full implementation of Police Order 2002 would have substantially restricted the use of police stations as instruments of political influence. Consequently, amendments introduced in 2004 altered the structure of public safety commissions and restored greater political influence over them. Following the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, policing and law and order became provincial responsibilities, and provinces developed their own legal frameworks. According to this analysis, these developments weakened the integrated national framework originally envisaged under Police Order 2002.
Ending Political Interference and Protecting Police Independence: Eliminating political interference is a fundamental requirement for an independent and impartial police service.
The minimum three-year tenure of the IGP and field commanders should receive strong legal protection so that officers are not forced to submit to political pressure. Authority over promotions, transfers, and postings should be removed from direct political control and entrusted to a fully autonomous Police Services Board operating without political interference.
Equally important is the establishment of an effective, independent civilian Police Complaints Authority outside the police chain of command. It should investigate complaints of police brutality, unlawful detention, bribery, and misconduct through a transparent and impartial process. Its membership should include retired judges, civil society representatives, and human rights experts. Such an institution would provide citizens with an independent mechanism for seeking justice and help establish accountability within the police service.
Digital Policing: Transforming the Thana Culture: Modern digital technology and e-policing could bring a fundamental transformation in the way police services are delivered and help free citizens from the fear and intimidation often associated with traditional police stations.
Under the existing structure, an ordinary citizen may have to depend on the discretion of a station clerk or SHO, or face demands for bribes and political recommendations, simply to register a First Information Report (FIR). Transferring this process to online Complaint Management Systems (CMS) and centralized cloud-based portals would allow citizens to register complaints and FIRs from home or through designated public service centers, without unnecessary harassment or humiliating treatment. Replacing traditional, inadequately trained front-desk personnel with professionally trained civilian staff equipped with modern information technology would further improve the experience of citizens approaching police stations. This initiative should be expanded to police stations throughout the country.
Body cameras should also be made mandatory for police personnel during arrests, raids, and custodial operations. Video surveillance systems in police stations should record custodial procedures, while information about detained individuals should be uploaded to a centralized dashboard with geotagging. These measures could significantly strengthen transparency and help prevent custodial torture, fake police encounters, and secret detention.
Scientific Investigation Instead of Custodial Torture : One of the most serious weaknesses in Pakistan’s investigative system is its longstanding reliance on extracting confessions through physical torture rather than establishing guilt through scientific and forensic evidence.
This practice constitutes a grave violation of human rights. It can lead to innocent people receiving death sentences or life imprisonment, while actual perpetrators escape punishment because investigators fail to collect reliable scientific evidence. To address this problem, Pakistan should establish a nationwide network of modern forensic laboratories across all provinces, drawing on the model of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency. Investigating officers should receive mandatory training in the scientific collection, preservation, and analysis of evidence. Criminal investigations should increasingly rely on DNA profiling, fingerprint analysis, chemical analysis, digital-device forensics, and firearms ballistics. When scientific evidence becomes the foundation of criminal investigations, reliance on coercive interrogation can be reduced, while the ability of courts to distinguish between innocent individuals and actual offenders can improve significantly.
Reforming the Law of Evidence for the Digital Age: The benefits of forensic science and digital evidence cannot be fully realized without corresponding reforms to Pakistan’s legal framework, particularly the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Pakistan’s law of evidence is rooted in an earlier legal tradition that placed considerable emphasis on oral testimony and documentary records. Although Article 164 permits courts to receive evidence obtained through modern devices and techniques, the practical treatment of digital evidence, video recordings, and forensic reports can still be influenced by judicial interpretation and the weight given to oral testimony. When a witness retracts a statement, an otherwise significant case may collapse if investigators have failed to establish independent corroborating evidence. The law should therefore be amended to provide clear and consistent rules governing the admissibility, authenticity, integrity, and evidentiary weight of forensic and digital material. Properly authenticated scientific evidence should be evaluated on its own merits rather than being automatically subordinated to eyewitness testimony. Such reforms would strengthen the ability of courts to decide cases on reliable scientific evidence, including situations in which eyewitnesses are unavailable or withdraw their statements, while preserving the accused person’s right to a fair trial.
Integrating Police, Prosecution, and the Judiciary: Pakistan’s policing system cannot be reformed in isolation because the police constitute only one part of the country’s three-part criminal justice system. The other two components are prosecution and the judiciary.
A serious lack of coordination among these institutions benefits offenders. Police investigations may produce weak case files or incomplete charge sheets, prosecutors may fail to pursue cases effectively, and court proceedings may remain pending for years. The article identifies Pakistan’s conviction rate as being between 5 and 10 percent. This figure should be independently verified against current official statistics before publication. To improve coordination, prosecutors should be involved from the earliest stages of investigations in serious criminal cases. Their participation would help investigating officers develop legally sound cases, strengthen evidence collection, and reduce the likelihood of charge sheets being rejected or cases collapsing during trial.
A Unified Criminal Justice Information System: Pakistan urgently needs an integrated Criminal Justice Information System connecting the police, forensic laboratories, prosecution departments, prisons, and courts through a centralized digital platform. A properly integrated system would allow relevant information to be securely shared and synchronized across institutions. It could help reduce problems involving prisoner production in court, missing case files, delayed witness notifications, and procedural delays. Clear and enforceable case-management timelines should also be considered. For example, the article proposes a target of three months for minor criminal cases and six months for serious criminal cases, subject to appropriate legal safeguards and the complexity of individual cases. Unjustified adjournments and deliberate investigative negligence should attract proportionate penalties in accordance with the law. At the same time, an independent and effective witness protection program is essential to protect witnesses from intimidation and retaliation. Finally, investigative funding should be provided directly through transparent and auditable mechanisms, ensuring that officers have the resources necessary to collect evidence without relying on illegal payments or financial pressure.
Conclusion: Reform the System, Not Just Its Appearance: Pakistan’s policing and criminal justice system requires a comprehensive transformation rather than cosmetic adjustments. Changing uniforms, introducing isolated technology projects, or announcing new policies cannot resolve structural problems rooted in colonial institutional practices, political interference, weak accountability, inadequate investigative resources, and poor coordination among justice institutions. The way forward lies in protecting police independence, establishing effective civilian oversight, adopting digital policing, strengthening forensic investigations, modernizing evidentiary laws, and integrating the work of police, prosecutors, prisons, and courts. The objective should not be to dismantle the police overnight, but to transform it into a professional, transparent, scientifically capable, and accountable public service.
Pakistan needs a police force that protects citizens rather than intimidates them, investigates crimes rather than extracts confessions, and serves the law rather than political interests. A stronger police institution, supported by an effective criminal justice system, is essential for public trust, equal justice, and a safer Pakistan.
