The Makkah Defense Pact: Pakistan’s New Strategic Test in a Changing World

Mian Iftikhar Ahmad

The joint defense agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye in Makkah represents an important development in the changing strategic environment of the Muslim world, the Middle East and South Asia. The agreement is not merely a formal military understanding between three countries; rather, its wider political, economic, military and diplomatic implications make it a potential indicator of a broader geopolitical transformation. The central concept of the agreement is that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three, creating a framework for collective defense and consultation. This principle distinguishes the agreement from many ordinary bilateral defense arrangements. Nevertheless, it would be premature to immediately describe it as a “Muslim NATO,” because the complete military structure, permanent unified command, operational arrangements and detailed procedures for mandatory military action have not yet been established at the level associated with NATO. The real significance of the agreement lies in the decision by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye to place their respective national strengths and defense capabilities within a framework that can gradually develop into institutionalised cooperation in military training, defense production, modern technology, intelligence, cyber security, air defense, maritime security and other strategic fields. The defense capabilities of the three countries are different, but in many respects they complement one another. Pakistan possesses a large and experienced military, nuclear capability, missile systems, air defense expertise and decades of military experience. Turkiye has developed its indigenous defense industry at an impressive pace and has established significant capabilities in drones, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, naval technology, artificial intelligence and other advanced defense sectors. Saudi Arabia possesses vast financial resources, enormous energy reserves, a strategically important geographical position in the Gulf and the financial capacity to acquire some of the most advanced defense systems available internationally. When these capabilities are considered together, it becomes clear that the agreement has the potential to become much more than a simple military cooperation arrangement. For Pakistan, one of the most important implications of the agreement is the possibility of taking its longstanding defense relationship with Saudi Arabia into a new phase. Defense cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has existed for decades, and Pakistani military personnel, trainers and specialists have played roles in strengthening Saudi defense capabilities in the past. The new agreement can transform this relationship into a more structured and multilateral defense framework. Pakistan could potentially gain new opportunities not only in defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia but also in economic, diplomatic and technological engagement. At the same time, Pakistan already enjoys strong defense relations with Turkiye, and the two countries have cooperated on a number of defense projects. The Makkah agreement could provide a broader platform for expanding that cooperation. Turkiye’s defense industry is particularly important for Pakistan because future warfare will not depend solely on conventional military strength. Drones, artificial intelligence, cyber systems, electronic warfare, satellite surveillance, precision weapons and advanced communication networks are increasingly becoming central to modern defense. If the three countries move towards joint defense production and technology transfer, Pakistan could gain substantial long-term benefits. For Saudi Arabia, the most important aspect of the agreement is the possibility of moving towards greater regional defense self-reliance. Saudi Arabia possesses some of the most sophisticated fighter aircraft, missile defense systems and other modern weapons, but purchasing advanced weapons and building an integrated and increasingly self-reliant defense system are two different things. The Makkah defense framework provides Saudi Arabia with an opportunity to benefit from Pakistan’s military experience and Turkiye’s expanding defense industry. Pakistan’s military training and operational experience can be valuable for Saudi Arabia, while Turkiye’s defense technology and industrial capabilities could contribute to the diversification and strengthening of Saudi defense capacity. Saudi Arabia, in turn, can use its economic strength to invest in joint defense projects, research, production and technological development. For Turkiye, the agreement is equally significant. Over recent years, Turkiye has sought to expand its foreign-policy influence across the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and other regions. A permanent defense partnership with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan could position Turkiye as an important strategic bridge between the Gulf and South Asia. Saudi Arabia represents a major market for Turkiye’s growing defense industry, while Pakistan is a longstanding strategic and defense partner. If Turkiye’s relations with both countries develop within a common defense framework, its regional influence could increase considerably. For this reason, it would be too narrow to view the Makkah agreement simply as a military arrangement between three countries. Its potential consequences extend to Iran, India, the United States, China, the Gulf states and other important countries of the Muslim world. The most sensitive and complicated dimension of the agreement is Iran. Relations between Iran and the Arab Gulf states have remained strategically sensitive for decades. Although Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye have described the agreement as defensive and have stated that it is not directed against any particular country, Iran will inevitably take note of the fact that Saudi Arabia’s security is now connected to a wider framework involving Pakistan and Turkiye. However, for Pakistan, transforming its relationship with Iran into open hostility would neither be simple nor strategically desirable. Pakistan and Iran are neighbours with a long shared border, historical, cultural and commercial links, and security interests directly connected to peace and stability in Balochistan. Pakistan therefore faces the difficult task of balancing its defense commitments to Saudi Arabia with its geographical and diplomatic relationship with Iran.

If Iran were to attack Saudi Arabia, the most important question for Pakistan would be how far it should go in implementing the defense agreement. It is essential to understand that collective defense does not necessarily mean that Pakistan would deploy its entire military against Iran. The nature of Pakistan’s response would depend on the scale and type of attack, the geographical circumstances, political decisions and military requirements. If Saudi Arabia faced limited missile or drone attacks, Pakistan could potentially assist through air defense, surveillance, radar, intelligence and defensive aircraft. If the attack became more extensive, Pakistani fighter aircraft, air defense systems and other defensive capabilities could be deployed to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s protection. If the conflict expanded into the maritime domain, cooperation in maritime security could also become necessary. But there is a clear distinction between defending Saudi Arabia and launching a ground war inside Iran. For Pakistan, the least desirable scenario would be to become involved in a prolonged ground conflict inside Iranian territory. Iran is a large country with vast geography, missile capabilities, drone technology, significant military strength and considerable regional influence. A full-scale Pakistan-Iran war could create not only military problems but also severe economic, diplomatic and internal-security challenges. Pakistan’s western border could become more unstable, Balochistan could face additional security pressures, border clashes could increase and trade and transportation could be disrupted. Furthermore, a prolonged conflict would place additional pressure on Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan is significantly dependent on imported energy, and an intensification of conflict in the Gulf could increase international oil prices. Petrol, diesel, electricity, industry, transportation and the prices of essential commodities could all be affected. Any closure or serious disruption of the Strait of Hormuz could create a major international economic crisis, and Pakistan would not remain insulated from its consequences. Therefore, Pakistan’s most prudent strategy would be a combination of defense and diplomacy. Pakistan could fulfil its commitments towards the defense of Saudi Arabia while keeping channels of communication open with Iran. Pakistan’s geographical position gives it a unique potential role. It is an important defense partner of Saudi Arabia while simultaneously sharing a border with Iran. If Islamabad uses its diplomatic capacity effectively, it could play a role in mediation, de-escalation and ceasefire efforts during a possible Saudi-Iran conflict. This could provide Pakistan with an opportunity to use not only its military strength but also its diplomatic influence. If Iran were to directly target Pakistan as well, however, the situation would change dramatically. Pakistan would no longer merely be assisting Saudi Arabia’s defense; it would itself become a direct party to the conflict. Attacks against Pakistani military installations, aircraft, naval assets or border areas could produce a much stronger Pakistani response. Even under such circumstances, however, Pakistan would have a strong interest in preventing the conflict from becoming a prolonged ground war. Deploying large numbers of Pakistani ground forces deep into Iran or attempting a long-term territorial occupation would not serve Pakistan’s wider interests. Pakistan’s military strategy would likely seek to focus on defending its own territory, protecting its forces and fulfilling its defensive responsibilities towards Saudi Arabia. India’s role in this wider strategic environment also deserves careful attention. If a significant portion of Pakistan’s military resources were deployed towards Saudi Arabia or became focused on the western front, India could potentially view the situation as a strategic opportunity. This does not mean that India would necessarily initiate a war against Pakistan. India would also understand that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country and that a major conflict could have extremely dangerous consequences. Nevertheless, India could increase its military preparedness, strengthen surveillance along the border, monitor Pakistani military movements and attempt diplomatically to challenge Pakistan’s expanding regional role. India could also attach greater importance to its relations with Iran, particularly through economic and regional connectivity projects. At the same time, India cannot ignore its own economic relationship with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is an important energy, investment and commercial partner for India. Therefore, it would not be realistic for India to view Saudi Arabia simply as part of an anti-Indian or anti-Indian-Pakistani bloc. Saudi Arabia itself is unlikely to abandon its economic relationship with India merely because of its defense cooperation with Pakistan. The roles of the United States and China will also remain important in this wider strategic environment. The United States remains a major power in the Gulf and has longstanding defense relations with Saudi Arabia. The Makkah agreement does not immediately replace the American security role in the region, but it gives Saudi Arabia additional regional defense partnerships and strategic options. China, meanwhile, has important relationships with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. China is a close strategic partner of Pakistan, its economic relations with Saudi Arabia have expanded significantly, and it also maintains important relations with Iran. Therefore, if a major conflict were to erupt between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China would have a strong interest in preventing the conflict from expanding and in preserving regional economic and commercial stability. Another important feature of the Makkah agreement is the possibility of future participation by other countries. If Egypt or another major Muslim country were to join the defense framework, its geographical, political and strategic significance could increase considerably. However, the larger such a framework becomes, the more complicated the differences among national interests may become. Each country would continue to make decisions according to its own foreign policy, domestic political environment and regional priorities. Therefore, any large defense alliance would require not only military cooperation but also a strong shared political commitment and clearly defined operational mechanisms. For Pakistan, the real test of the Makkah agreement will be how effectively it can use this opportunity in accordance with its national interests. If the agreement develops into permanent programmes for joint military exercises, defense production, technology transfer, intelligence cooperation, air defense, cyber security and research, Pakistan could gain substantial long-term advantages. Joint defense production could create opportunities for employment, exports, technology development and industrial growth. By combining Turkiye’s advanced defense technology with Saudi Arabia’s investment capacity and Pakistan’s military expertise and industrial potential, Pakistan could strengthen its own defense industry and expand its role in regional security. At the same time, Pakistan must ensure that the defense agreement does not unnecessarily restrict its independent foreign policy. Friendship with Saudi Arabia is important, partnership with Turkiye is valuable, geographical proximity to Iran is a permanent reality, relations with China remain a major pillar of Pakistan’s foreign policy, and the continuing strategic competition with India cannot be ignored. Maintaining balance among all these factors will be one of the greatest tests of Pakistan’s diplomacy. If Iran attacks Saudi Arabia in the future, Pakistan will have to make decisions based on national interest rather than emotion. Supporting the defense of Saudi Arabia may be part of the spirit of the agreement, but sending Pakistani ground forces deep into Iran in every possible conflict would not necessarily be required and would not necessarily be in Pakistan’s broader national interest. Pakistan’s military strategy could focus on defensive assistance, air protection, intelligence, surveillance, maritime security and the protection of Saudi territory, while diplomacy could be used to prevent the conflict from spreading. If Pakistan succeeds in doing so, the Makkah agreement could become not only a military commitment but also a diplomatic opportunity. Pakistan could use its historical, geographical and military importance in the Muslim world to play the role of a bridge for peace and communication. Such a role could distinguish Pakistan from other regional powers. Pakistan certainly possesses military strength, but its real strategic power will become evident when it succeeds in combining military capability, economic interests, diplomacy and regional peace within a coherent national strategy. The Makkah Defense Pact can therefore be regarded as both a historic opportunity and a major test for Pakistan. It can take Pakistan’s defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Turkiye to a new level, open doors to advanced technology and defense production, increase Pakistan’s diplomatic importance in the Muslim world and give it a more visible role in the emerging security architecture of the Middle East. At the same time, there is a genuine risk that if a major regional war erupts, pressure on Pakistan to support its partners will increase. Islamabad will therefore have to ensure at every stage that national security, economic stability and regional peace remain balanced. Defending Saudi Arabia may become an important responsibility for Pakistan, but entering into an unnecessary and prolonged war with Iran would not serve Pakistan’s interests. India’s possible reaction cannot be ignored either, but Pakistan’s nuclear capability and the regional balance of power would also force India to exercise caution. Ultimately, the success of the Makkah Defense Pact will not be determined by the scale of the political statements surrounding it, but by the extent to which the three countries transform their commitments into practical cooperation. If joint defense projects, advanced technology, defense production, training, intelligence sharing and diplomatic coordination are strengthened, the agreement could become the foundation of an effective regional defense framework in the coming years. If that does not happen, it could remain largely a political symbol. For Pakistan, the best course is to maintain its defense capabilities while keeping diplomatic channels open, strengthen relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, avoid unnecessary confrontation with Iran, closely monitor India’s potential response and strengthen its economic foundation. In the modern world, military strength alone cannot make a country secure; a strong economy, balanced foreign policy, advanced technology, effective diplomacy and decisions based on national interest are the real foundations of national security. The Makkah Defense Pact could therefore become a new chapter in Pakistan’s comprehensive national strategy, provided Islamabad approaches it with strategic patience, diplomatic wisdom and a clear understanding of its long-term national interests.