(Publish from Houston Texas USA)
(Writer: Mian Iftikhar Ahmad)
The world is currently passing through a period of profound uncertainty, where certain incidents do not appear to be mere coincidences but rather early indicators of major geopolitical shifts. Recent developments involving the United States, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan have raised important questions. The attack near the White House, allegedly involving a person linked to Afghanistan, cross-border firing and incursions into Tajikistan from the Afghan side, and the escalating border tensions with Pakistan have intensified the debate over whether these events are spontaneous or part of a larger, hidden strategy. After the Taliban returned to power, the United States seemingly reduced its direct engagement with Afghanistan, yet Afghanistan has never been insignificant in global politics.
A country where the world’s strongest armies remained for two decades cannot simply become irrelevant after a sudden withdrawal. Such a departure naturally creates a vacuum that encourages multiple state and non-state groups to assert their influence. Various ideological, ethnic, and political divisions inside Afghanistan have already widened, and different factions are emerging with competing agendas. When an attack near one of the most sensitive places in the United States is linked to someone associated with Afghanistan, American policymakers immediately conclude that the security vacuum created after withdrawal is now directly affecting U.S. internal safety. This has revived debates in Washington about whether America’s internal security can be ensured without reassessing its approach to Afghanistan. Many U.S. defense, intelligence, and political circles have long argued that Afghanistan could once again become a haven for global extremist movements, and that a global power cannot afford to ignore such a threat. Meanwhile, the attacks on Tajikistan’s border from inside Afghanistan have further strengthened these concerns. Tajikistan is not merely a small Central Asian state; it is Russia’s close ally and a strategic gateway for Chinese economic initiatives in the region.
Any military activity along its border has implications for both Russia and China. The instability emerging from Afghan soil can spill across Central Asia, drawing major regional powers into the turbulence. The United States traditionally views such instability as an opportunity to justify its strategic interventions. The attacks on Tajikistan demonstrate that the Taliban administration does not hold complete control over Afghanistan’s territory. When the borders of a state appear beyond the command of its own government, global powers often label it an international threat and consider direct or indirect intervention. A similar pattern is emerging along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
Continuous firing from the Afghan side, attacks on Pakistani personnel, infiltration by militant groups, and allegations of safe havens inside Afghanistan have forced Pakistan to reassess the rapidly changing regional environment. Pakistan’s security policy has always been deeply interconnected with developments in Afghanistan, and Pakistan remains one of the most affected countries whenever instability rises in the region.
If three countries – Pakistan, Tajikistan, and the United States – begin perceiving similar threats originating from the same territory, it creates conditions ripe for a major geopolitical shift. The central question is whether the U.S. is genuinely contemplating a return to Afghanistan. A full-scale ground invasion appears unlikely in the near future because the American public and economy cannot support another prolonged war. However, the U.S. has always maintained an intermediate option: limited military operations, drone strikes, air raids, and targeted counterterrorism actions. This has long been America’s preferred model in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen. The U.S. could easily adopt this framework once again in Afghanistan, enabling intervention without occupation. Another important concern for the U.S. is the loss of strategic airbases in the region, especially the former Bagram Air Base.
For twenty years, it was one of America’s most valuable outposts, enabling rapid action across China, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia. Losing Bagram was a significant strategic setback. This is why a growing debate in Washington suggests that if not inside Afghanistan, the U.S. may seek an airbase in a neighboring country to restore its regional military reach. An equally important question is whether these developments are natural or artificially engineered. The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Afghanistan’s internal instability is real: the Taliban government is not entirely unified; different factions control different areas; border management is weak; economic collapse has created fertile ground for recruitment by extremist organizations. These conditions naturally generate regional insecurity. Yet global powers often use such conditions to advance their own strategic goals.
The Wars rarely begin because of a single incident, but a series of recurring events often points toward a larger underlying design. If the U.S. becomes convinced that global militancy is resurging from Afghanistan, that Central Asia is slipping under Russian and Chinese influence, and that escalating tensions on Pakistan’s and Tajikistan’s borders are destabilizing the region, then limited but aggressive U.S. operations in Afghanistan become a strong possibility. The U.S. has no interest in permanent occupation or another lengthy war, but it will not ignore any territory that appears to threaten its national security once again. For this reason, the likelihood of renewed drone strikes, covert operations, targeted air raids, and small-scale Special Forces missions remains high. The real danger for the region is that a continued American intervention, even if limited, will directly impact Pakistan. Militants active in the Afghan border areas may intensify their activities inside Pakistan.
The Taliban government may face increasing pressure from multiple directions, potentially shifting the regional power balance again. Tajikistan and Central Asia may also face heightened insecurity, potentially harming China’s major economic corridors. India may exploit the situation to expand its influence inside Afghanistan. Collectively, these factors could pull the region back into the same instability that consumed two decades and countless sacrifices. In conclusion, current developments indicate that the U.S. is unlikely to launch a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan. However, the probability of a limited military re-entry through airstrikes, drones, and covert missions is steadily increasing. The situation is deteriorating partly on its own and partly through engineered dynamics, and together these forces are pushing the region toward a new era of crisis – with Afghanistan once again at the center.
About the Author
